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DEVELOPING VENTURE CAPITAL LAWS IN CHINA: LESSONS
LEARNED FROM THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY, AND JAPAN
I. INTRODUCTION
Dateline: Aug. 5, 1995, Silicon Valley-Today, Netscape
Communications Corporation (Netscape) made history on Wall
Street by becoming the hottest initial public offering (IPO) of all
time.' Netscape's underwriters initially priced the 3.5 million
shares to be offered at $12 to $14 per share.2 As the IPO date
approached, however, demand for the stock was so high that the
offering was expanded to five million shares, and the price was
increased to $28 per share.3 Nevertheless, even doubling the price
of the offering, a virtually unprecedented occurrence. in an IPO,
the underwriters still did not aim high enough.4 At the opening
bell on the NASDAQ5 the stock went out at $71 per share and
rose as high as $75 in the same day before settling down around
the $50s, 6 making venture capitalist Jim Clark the first "Internet
billionaire," and netting Netscape's co-founder, 24-year-old Marc
Andreessen, a fortune close to $100 million.7 Not bad for a single
day's work.
1. Doug Wagner, Netscape Communications Corporation, JONES
TELECOMMUNICATIONS & MULTIMEDIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, at
http://www.digitalcentury.com/encyclo/update/netscape.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2000).
An IPO is the offering of a company's securities to the public for the first time. See JAMES
D. Cox ET AL, SECURITIES REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (2d ed. 1997). A
company engaged in the process of an IPO is also commonly referred to as "going public."
See id.
2. Robert Seidman, Netscape's IPO, IN, AROUND AND ONLINE-ISSUE 2.32,
http://www.onlineinsider.com/htm/archives/081195.htmi (Aug. 11, 1995).
3. Id
4. Id.
5. "NASDAQ" is an acronym for National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotron, the dominant over-the-counter (OTC) stock market in the United
States. Eric C. Sibbitt, Law, Venture Capital, and Entrepreneurism in Japan: A
Microeconomic Perspective on the Impact of Law on the Generation and Financing of
Venture Businesses, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 61, 62 (1998).
6. Seidman, supra note 2.
7. Wagner, supra note 1.
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The ripple effect of the Netscape IPO was felt throughout the
world,8 especially in the People's Republic of China (China),
where the government is keenly interested in developing venture
capital to fuel the growth of its burgeoning high-tech industry.
9
Even though China has attracted significant venture capital
financing in the last decade, 10 venture capital laws currently do not
exist in China." The Chinese government recently announced
plans to draft venture capital laws in an effort to improve the
investment environment and encourage venture capital financing
of the high-tech sector. 12  The government acknowledged,
however, that this would be a lengthy, multi-year process. 13 Given
China's unique political, economic, and financial structures, the
Chinese government recognizes the need for comprehensive
regulations 14
This Comment focuses not only on the types of laws required,
but also on the larger institutional structure necessary for the
development of a vibrant venture capital industry in China.
Additionally, this Comment explores the role of law in the
relationship between corporate governance 15 and the growth of
venture capital. Part II analyzes the U.S. venture capital industry
in the context of the U.S. market-centered corporate governance
model. Part III surveys the German and Japanese bank-centered
model. Using these two contrasting models as a conceptual
8. See Sibbitt, supra note 5, at 69 (noting that the Netscape IPO "helped boost the
Internet and the World Wide Web," and "promoted the funding of other ventures"). The
author also notes that "Japan has yet to produce an IPO as successful as Netscape." Id. at
86.
9. See High-Tech Sector Wants Money: Report, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Aug. 30,
2000, LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File.
10. See Venture Capital in China: Enter at Your Own Risk, CHINAONLINE, Jan. 7,
2000, LEXIS, News Library, Chinao File [hereinafter Enter at Your Own Risk] (reporting
that over the last four years, China has attracted more overseas venture capital than any
other developing country in southeast Asia).
11. Id.
12. See China Seeking to Develop Venture Capital with New Laws, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 9, 1999, LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.
13. Id. (reporting that Cheng Siwei, the Vice Chairman of the National People's
Congress, stated that the drafting process would take at least two years).
14. See discussion infra Part IV.
15. Corporate governance concerns the distribution of power among shareholders,
officers, directors, and to a lesser extent, other constituencies such as employees and
creditors of a corporation. See Arthur R. Pinto, The United States, in THE LEGAL BASIS
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS 253, 262 (Arthur R.
Pinto & Gustavo Visentini eds., 1998).
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framework, Part IV examines the current institutional structure in
China and discusses how China can utilize the lessons learned by
the United States, Germany, and Japan. Finally, Part V concludes
with recommendations for institutional reforms in order to
develop venture capital in China.
II. THE U.S. MODEL
The venture capital industry has played a significant role in
the growth of the U.S. economy. 6 Particularly in the last decade,
venture capital has been the engine that propelled the spectacular
rise of the Internet economy and the high-tech sector.17 Stocks of
"dot.coms" reached dizzying heights and created instant
millionaires by the week. 8  In 1999 alone, venture capital
investment averaged $2 billion per week, or more than $100 billion
per year, up 150% from the previous year.19 By most accounts the
success of the U.S. venture capital industry is the envy of the
world .20
Such success is by no means the result of happenstance or
good timing; rather, it is the product of the institutional
structure-that unique confluence of laws, financial markets,
regulatory systems, and social norms long in existence in the
United States.21  Much scholarly discourse has been devoted to
the role of the U.S. financial framework in the development of
16. Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan:
Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 Nw. U. L. REv.
865, 866 (1997) (citing a Congressional report finding "the venture capital community [to
be] a vital link in the process of capital formation, technological changes, and economic
growth."); see also William A. Sahlman, Insights from the Venture Capital Model of
Project Governance, BUS. ECON., July 1994, at 37 (crediting venture capital with creating
some of the most successful companies in the United States).
17. See Milhaupt, supra note 16, at 870 (noting that venture capital is "almost an
essential form of financing" for high-risk, high-tech companies).
18. See, e.g., Seidman, supra note 2.
19. See Venture Capital Basics, SALARY.COM, at 1, at
http://www.vault.comlnr/mainarticle_detall.jsp?article-id=52583&ht-type=5 (Sept. 13,
2000) (quoting National Venture Capital Association statistics).
20. Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of
Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 245 (1998); see also
JOSEPH W. BARTLETr, VENTURE CAPITAL: LAW, BUSINESS STRATEGIES, AND
INVESTMENT PLANNING 12 (1988) (commenting that venture capital "is the one technique
our competitors in other industrial countries have yet to master.").
21. See infra Part ll.B-C.
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venture capital.22 Legal commentators and economists alike
largely attribute the unparalleled growth of the venture capital
industry_ in the United States to the U.S. market-centered
system.2-  They argue that a well-developed stock market is
fundamental to the development of the venture capital industry.
24
This Comment expands on their theory by further positing that
the U.S. venture capital industry owes its success in large measure
to the operations of law at each stage of its development. Just as a
corporation "operates under a series of legal rules, markets, and
private ordering" and these legal rules "shape the basic structure
of corporate organs, define the rights of corporate actors, and set
the boundaries for private ordering,"25 the venture capital
industries in the United States, Germany, and Japan are similarly
shaped by the operations of law.
A. A Primer on the Venture Capital Industry
Venture capital in the United States is perhaps best defined
as "investment by specialized organizations ...in high-growth,
high-risk, often high-technology firms that need [capital] to
finance product development or growth and must, by the nature
of their business, obtain this capital largely in the form of equity
rather than debt."26  Unlike banks, which lend money to the
borrower, venture capitalists provide financing to a startup
company27 by acquiring part ownership in the company through
equity investments.28 The companies that receive venture capital
funding are called "portfolio companies.,
29
22. See, e.g., Milhaupt, supra note 16, at 879-81.
23. See, e.g., Black & Gilson, supra note 20, at 243-45.
24. Id
25. Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Relational Theory of Japanese Corporate Governance:
Contract, Culture, and the Rule of Law, 37 HARv. INT'LL.J. 3,4 (1996).
26. Black & Gilson, supra note 20, at 245. Alternatively, venture capital has also
been defined as "a professionally managed pool of capital that is invested in equity-linked
securities of private ventures at various stages in their development." William A.
Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN.
ECON. 473, 473 (1990).
27. A startup is a newly formed company founded by an entrepreneur. JOSEPH W.
BARTLETT, EQuITY FINANCE: VENTURE CAPiTAL, BUYOUTS, RESTRUCrTURINGS AND
REORGANIZATIONS 6 (2d ed. 1995).
28. Venture Capital Basics, supra note 19, at 2.
29. The term "portfolio company" denotes the fact that the company is but one in the
venture capitalist's portfolio of companies. See BARTLETT, supra note 27, at 3, 4.
490 [Vol. 23:487
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Along with the significant risk associated with the
investment-the company could fail and render the venture
capitalists' investment worthless-comes huge upside potential.
30
Venture capitalists expect that the company will take the infusion
of cash to fund its growth, and create a business that is worth
substantially more than before the venture capital investment.
31
In exchange for their investment in the startup, the venture
capitalists often obtain a significant stake in the company. 32 Along
with ownership comes the right to monitor management, whereby
the venture capitalists are directly involved in corporate
governance, including determining the company's business
strategy, its products and services, its capital structure, its
personnel, and even its name.33  In addition, venture capitalists
often receive annual management fees of approximately 2% to
2.5% of committed capital and a share of the company's profits.
34
The biggest financial payoff for venture capitalists occurs at the
point of exit, usually three to five years after initial investment,
when the venture capital fund "cashes out" of the company via an
IPO or sale to another entity.
35
B. The Role of Law
The U.S. institutional structure-laws, business practices, and
social norms-has been cited as the driving force of the U.S.
venture capital market.36  In particular, the success of the U.S.
venture capital industry, to a large extent, is attributable to the
existence of laws that govern all aspects of the venture capital
investment process from formation, to entry, to exit.
30. Venture Capital Basics, supra note 19, at 2.
31. Id.
32. See Christopher B. Barry et al., The Role of Venture Capital in the Creation of
Public Companies, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 447, 448 (1990) (noting that at the time of an IPO, the
aggregate holdings by all the venture capitalists represent, on average, 34% of the
outstanding shares of the portfolio company).
33. Venture Capital Basics, supra note 19, at 2; see also Sahlman, supra note 26, at
508.
34. Venture Capital Basics, supra note 19, at 2; see also Sahlman, supra note 26, at
491.
35. See Black & Gilson, supra note 20, at 257.
36. Milhaupt, supra note 16, at 879-80.
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1. The Venture Capital Fund and the Role of Law in Its
Formation
Venture capitalists invest in startups through venture capital
funds.37 In the United States, a venture capital fund is generally
organized as a limited partnership, where the partners are the
capital providers.38 At the inception of the venture capital fund, a
limited partnership agreement between the fund and the capital
providers is executed.39  Like any limited partnership, the
agreement sets forth the rights and obligations of the general
partners and limited partners, the duration of the partnership, and
dissolution procedures.
40
A limited partnership enjoys several advantages over
corporations and general partnerships. First, unlike general
partners who are personally liable for all of the debts and
obligations of the partnership, a limited partner is only liable up to
the extent of his or her capital contribution. 4 1 In other words, a
limited partner stands to lose only the capital contribution if the
venture capital fund fails.42 Thus, the limited partner is shielded
from exposure to liabilities incurred by the partnership. 43  The
legislature designed this limited liability feature to encourage
investment by a limited partner, 44 particularly the small individual
investor, who does not wish to live in fear that his or her
investment in a venture capital fund could result in losing the
family home.
Second, like partnerships, a limited partnership enjoys
favorable tax treatment because limited partnership income is not
subject to taxation at the partnership level.45 Limited partnerships
are not taxed as separate entities; rather, the profits from the
37. See Sahlman, supra note 26, at 487.
38. Milhaupt, supra note 16, at 885. In a typical venture capital fund, the venture
capitalists serve as general partners and other investors serve as limited partners. Id
39. See Black & Gilson, supra note 20, at 256.
40. Typically, the maximum duration of the venture capital limited partnership is set
at seven to ten years, after which the partnership must be liquidated and the proceeds
distributed to the partners. Id. at 256.
41. Evans v. Galardi, 16 Cal. 3d 300, 305 (1976).
42. Id
43. See, e.g., CAL CORP. CODE § 15632 (Deering 1997); Milhaupt, supra note 16, at
885.
44. See, e.g., Galardi, 16 Cal. 3d at 306 (finding that the legislative recognition of
limited partnership as business entity was to encourage investment).
45. I.R.C. § 701 (1988).
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partnership "flow through" to the partners and are taxable to the
partners as personal income only, thereby avoiding double
taxation. 46 Thus, the law operates to encourage the formation of,
as well as investment in, venture capital funds.
2. The Role of Law in Venture Capital Funding Sources
At its initial stage, a venture capital fund first needs to
generate funding from investors.47  Here, U.S. laws and
regulations have not only spurred the investment in venture
capital funds, but also fundamentally shaped the development of
the funds' sources.48
To begin, venture capital funds raise money from two types
of investors: institutions and individuals. 49  Data compiled by
researchers indicate that pension funds and insurance companies
constitute the primary investors. 50 Pension funds contributed
40% of the capital raised by venture capital funds annually over
the last decade, as a direct result of U.S. government regulations.
51
In 1979, the Department of Labor expressly authorized pension
funds to invest in venture capital funds. 52 Previously, there had
been virtually no pension fund investments in venture capital
funds because the legality of such investments was in question.
53
The effect of this revised law is amply demonstrated by the flow of
pension fund investment into venture capital funds, which began
in 1979 and continues unabated to date.
5 4
46. See id. Double taxation is one of the primary drawbacks of a corporation. See
ROBERTW. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 150 (6th ed. 1998).
An individual pays personal income tax on income at a rate according to the level of
taxable income. Id. Likewise, a corporation pays corporate income tax according to its
level of taxable income. Id. When a corporation pays dividends to its shareholders, the
corporation has already paid income tax on those dividends. Id. The dividends, however,
are also taxable to the shareholder as personal income. Id. This concept is known as
"double taxation." Id.
47. See BARTLETr, supra note 27, at 6.
48. See discussion infra Part II.B.4.
49. See Sahlman, supra note 26, at 488.
50. See Black & Gilson, supra note 20, at 249.
51. For example, in 1992, 42% of venture capital contribution came from pension
funds, 15% from insurance companies, and the remaining from individual investors and
family. Id.
52. See Black & Gilson, supra note 20, at 269-70.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 270.
2001] 493
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Additionally, unlike countries such as Germany and Japan,
where a company's employee pension fund can remain unfunded,
in the United States, the law requires companies to fund pension
funds. For example, the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA)55 established mandatory minimum funding levels in
1973.56 Thus, many companies have pension funds with
substantial assets and are able to make investments as they see
fit.57  Pension funds choose to invest in venture capital funds
because of the high rate of return.
58
Conversely, U.S. laws have also operated to prevent certain
sectors from investing in venture capital funds. 9  A primary
example is the banking industry, where, through stock ownership
and line of business restrictions, banking regulations prohibit
banks from entering commerce.60 Until it was recently abolished,
the Glass-Steagall Act historically drew a line separating
commercial banks from investment banks.61 Commercial banks
were barred from conducting securities business or maintaining
close affiliations with investment banks and, until recently, mutual
funds.62  Glass-Steagall also prohibited banks from acquiring
stocks themselves. 63  The Bank Holding Company Act further
fine-tuned Glass-Steagall by prohibiting bank affiliation with non-
banks (including insurers), yet allows passive ownership of no
more than 5% of a non-bank's stock.64
Indeed, one influential commentator has compared these
laws to "the San Andreas fault line, . . . historically severing
America's largest financial institutions from its largest industrial
firms." 65 Consequently, it has been illegal for American banks to
55. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461).
56. See Black & Gilson, supra note 20, at 270. An unfunded pension plan is treated as
a liability in the company's financial statements. Id. It represents a company's future
obligation to pay pensions to employees when they retire. Id
57. Id
58. See Milhaupt, supra note 16, at 880-81.
59. Mark J. Roe, Some Differences of Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and
the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1949 (1993).
60. Id.
61. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C. (1988)).
62. Roe, supra note 59, at 1949.
63. Id
64. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 4(a), 60 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(1) (1988)).
65. Roe, supra note 59, at 1930.
[Vol. 23:487
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invest in venture capital funds, much less assume a significant role
as do their counterparts in Germany and Japan. 66  Without the
dominating presence of banks, U.S. venture capital developed
other private funding sources and independently grew.
67
3. The Role of Law at the Point of Entry
At the point of entry, when venture capitalists make the
initial investment in a startup, the risk they assume is great due to
the uncertainty over the company's viability.68  The company is
usually in its embryonic stage, with no proven track record and
negative cash flow.69  Venture capitalists, especially general
partners of venture capital funds who bear the highest risk, are
naturally interested in protecting their investment.70  "Venture
capitalists ensure that their investments are protected through
contracting with the management of the companies in which they
invest."
71
This particular form of venture capital contracting, based on a
corporate governance system centered on the stock market, is
unique to the United States.72 Once again, law plays a pivotal role
both in defining and limiting the terms of the venture capital
contract. Though these contracts vary from transaction to
transaction, certain provisions are standard.7 3 The contracts
66. See id. at 1948. Roe also argues that if U.S. banks tried to imitate German banks,
they would run afoul of nearly every U.S. financial regulation. Id. at 1949. In addition to
Glass-Steagall and the Bank Holding Company Act, the McFadden Act of 1927 allows
national banks to open branches only if permitted by state law. Id at 1948. Up until
recently, state laws prohibited local branches. McFadden Act, ch. 191, § 1, 44 Stat. 1224
(1927) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988)).
67. See Sahiman, supra note 26, at 488.
68. See Venture Capital Basics, supra note 19, at 3 (citing U.S. Small Business
Administration statistics indicating that almost 80% of all startups fail in the first six
years).
69. See Haksoo Ko & Hyun Young Shin, Venture Capital in Korea? Special Law to
Promote Venture Capital Companies, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 457, 466 (2000) (noting
that at the early stage of a company's existence, equity financing is essential because the
company's negative cash flow prevents it from obtaining debt financing).
70. See generally Sahlman, supra note 16, at 36.
71. Douglas G. Smith, The Venture Capital Company: A Contractarian Rebuttal to
the Political Theory of American Corporate Finance?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 79, 103 (1997).
72. See Ko & Shin, supra note 69, at 460 (arguing that the particular venture capital
contracting model that aligns the incentives of the various contracting parties is prevalent
in the United States only).
73. Smith, supra note 71, at 104.
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invariably include the following terms: board representation and
restrictive covenants on management. 74
a. Representation on the Company's Board of Directors
"Venture capitalists often demand a significant voice on the
board of directors." 75  They generally obtain at least enough
actual representation to block important board actions.76 "This is
one of the most significant mechanisms through which venture
capitalists exercise control over management of their portfolio
companies." 77 As members of the board, venture capitalists are in
a position to monitor management's activities.78 Given the great
risk venture capitalists face at this stage, one might rationalize that
they would be inclined to actually assume full control of the
portfolio company in order to minimize the risk of
mismanagement. 79  The law, however, works to provide a
disincentive to assuming control.
Venture capitalists generally avoid gaining actual control of
the company by occupying less than half of the seats on the
company's board of directors in order to avoid the regulatory
consequences of gaining control over companies.8 ° Among other
things, being deemed a "controlling person" may expose an
individual to liability to creditors and other investors.81 As one
commentator notes, control entails legal responsibility.82 Because
venture capital investment is already risky, taking on liability to
creditors and other shareholders increases the risk
exponentially. 83 Thus, the law provides a check on the venture
capitalists as well.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 107.
76. See Richard Testa et al., Venture Capital Investment, in VENTURE CAPITAL 1991:
FORMING THE FUND AND FINANCING ISSUES 9, 12 (1991).
77. Smith, supra note 71, at 107.
78. Black & Gilson, supra note 20, at 253.
79. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 71, at 105.
80. Id. at 107.
81. 15 U.S.C. 77o (1994).
82. Smith, supra note 71, at 108-09.
83. See BARTLETr, supra note 27, at 4.
496 [Vol. 23:487
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b. Restrictive Covenants that Constrain the Behavior of
Managers
"In addition to representation on the board of directors,
venture capitalists generally constrain the action of management
by negotiating a number of different kinds of restrictive covenants
to help protect their investment."8 4 These covenants prohibit self-
dealing by the management, and prevent managers from
"usurping corporate opportunities and competing with the firm."8 5
Some provisions even call for managers to cooperate -with the
company even after their departure.
8 6
Another significant form of managerial control is through
compensation packages that emphasize stock options over present
income so that managers have an incentive to maximize
shareholder value.8 7 Further, the stock options usually vest over a
period of years so that if a manager leaves before the options are
fully vested, he or she loses all of the unvested options.88 This
helps to ensure that the manager does not endeavor to maximize
his or her own personal short-term profit at the expense of the
company's future.
8 9
Venture capital contracts also require periodic disclosures of
financial information by management to the venture capitalists. 90
These include adherence to prescribed levels of current ratio,
working capital, short and long-term debt, net worth, and
restrictions against encumbrances of assets.91 Obviously, these
terms assume the existence of generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) so that the financial statements can be
meaningfully interpreted and relied upon by the user, namely the
venture capitalists.
9 2
4. The Role of Law at the Point of Exit
Perhaps the greatest benefit U.S. law provides to the venture
capital industry is in the regulation of the U.S. stock market. As
84. Smith, supra note 71, at 110.
85. Id. at 113.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 114.
88. Id. at 115-16.
89. See id. at 116.
90. Id. at 117.
91. Id. at 120.
92. See infra Part 11.3.4 (discussing the U.S. accounting system).
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commentators note, without a stock market, a portfolio company
cannot have an IPO, thereby foreclosing the primary avenue of
exit for venture capital funds.93
The importance of an IPO as a means to exit from (or cash
out of) an investment cannot be underestimated. Beyond
investors' obvious need for liquidity, an IPO serves as a measure
of a venture capital fund's and the venture capitalists'
performance. 94 Because venture capitalists contribute more than
money to a portfolio company-they also provide "reputational
capital" to the startup-there must exist an objective measure of
this nonfinancial contribution. 95 Third parties such as customers,
suppliers, managers, and underwriters rely on this benchmark for
their own decisions on whether to transact business with the
portfolio company.96 Further, as a portfolio company grows and
its management gains experience, the relative value of the venture
capitalists' nonfinancial contribution declines, thereby making it
more efficient for the venture capitalists to exit and invest in other
early-stage companies, where their reputational capital would be
of greater value.97
Because an IPO is only possible through a stock market,98 the
existence of a healthy stock market is essential to the development
of the venture capital industry. The U.S. venture capital industry
has been the happy beneficiary of the efficiency and vitality of the
U.S. stock market.99 The growth of the U.S. stock market is, in
turn, directly attributable to the operations of law, specifically
securities regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).100
The primary objectives of U.S. securities laws, as
administered by the SEC, "are to protect investors and ensure
93. See Black & Gilson, supra note 20, at 245.
94. Id. at 255.
95. Id. at 252 (defining reputational capital as the reputation of a venture capital fund
that enables it to engage various third parties, such as underwriters, and develop the
portfolio company).
96. Id. at 254.
97. Id. at 255.
98. Id at 245.
99. See id.
100. Roberta S. Karmel, Stock Market and the Globalization of Retirement Savings-
Implications of Privatization of Government Pensions for Securities Regulators, 33 INT'L
LAW. 955, 962 (1999).
[Vol. 23:487
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that securities markets are fair, efficient, and transparent.'' 101 The
SEC performs its watchdog function primarily via the Securities
Act of 1933 (1933 Act) 10 2 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act).'0 3  The 1933 Act governs the public offering of
securities; it provides that any such offering must be registered
with the SEC before securities may be sold.'04
The hallmark of both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act is
disclosure. 10 5 The 1933 Act requires full and fair disclosure to be
made in the registration statement that must be filed with the SEC
as part of the company's public offering process. 10 6 The disclosure
requirements are voluminous, ranging from information
concerning the company's business to the background of
management personnel and perceived risk factors of the
offering.10 7  The registration statement also requires audited
financial statements.
108
The 1934 Act covers securities trading and requires periodic
reporting by registered companies. 1° 9 Companies whose stocks
are listed on a national stock exchange, such as the New York
Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ, are subject to the reporting
requirements of the 1934 Act. 110 These companies must file an
annual report (10-K) with the SEC, including audited financial
statements, and quarterly reports (10-Q) with unaudited financial
statements."' Additionally, they must also report events of
material importance soon after the events occur.
112
These extensive reporting requirements, more stringent than
those of any other country,1 3 serve to protect investors, provide
transparency to the system, prevent fraud, and thereby promote
investor confidence in the market. 114  They are directly
101. Id.
102. Id at 971.
103. Id
104. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74.
105. See Karmel, supra note 100, at 971.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1994).
107. See id § 77g.
108. See id § 77e.
109. Securities Act of 1933, § 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78m (1994).
110. Id. § 78i(g).
111. HAMILTON, supra note 46, at 334.
112. Id.
113. Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 113, 113 n.1 (1999).
114. See Karmel, supra note 100, at 962.
20011
500 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 23:487
responsible for making the U.S. stock market the success it is
today.115 Additionally, a complex set of civil liability provisions
supplements the SEC's enforcement of these regulations.
116
The strict reporting requirements of U.S. securities laws are
made possible by high quality accounting standards-a critical
component of the U.S. regulatory system. 117  A company's
financial statements must be prepared according to GAAP, which
are "concepts and standards underlying accounting for financial
reporting purposes." 118  These principles provide "a common
financial language to enable informed users to read and interpret
financial statements. '"119  The financial statements are then
audited by independent certified public accountants, who verify
the accuracy of the financial statement representations according
to generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS).1 2' Both
GAAP and GAAS are designed to provide investors with relevant
and reliable financial information to facilitate decision-making.
121
Such comprehensive disclosure requirements have given investors
confidence in the U.S. stock market and spurred its growth. 2 2
Consequently, venture capital investors are able to rely on the
stock market as the primary means of exit.
123
115. See id.
116. See Eric M. Sherbet, Bridging the GAAP: Accounting Standards for Foreign SEC
Registrants, 29 INT'L LAW. 875, 893-94 (1995).
117. See id at 875; see also Karmel, supra note 100, at 962.
118. ERIC G. FLAM-OLTZ ET AL., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 8 (1986).
GAAP primarily come from pronouncements of the accounting profession's self-governing
bodies such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board, other groups affiliated with the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and the SEC. Id.
119. Id.
120. ROGER H. HERMANSON ET AL, AUDITING THEORY AND PRACTICE 16 (4th ed.
1987).
121. Audited financial statements must include the balance sheet, the income
statement, the retained earnings statement, and the cash flows statement. FLAMHOLTZ Er
AL., supra note 118, at 10.
122. Statistical studies have demonstrated the value of U.S. GAAP to investors. For
example, in a study published in the 1993 Journal of Accounting Research, researchers
compared annual earnings and corresponding stock prices based on a sample of several
thousand annual reports from seventeen countries from 1983 to 1990. Andrew Alford et
al., The Relative Informativeness of Accounting Disclosures in Different Countries, 31 J.
ACCr. RES. 183 (Supp. 1993). The study found a high degree of correlation between
accounting measures and stock price/return, particularly in the United States, evidencing
the relevancy of financial statement information to investment decisions. Id A much
lesser degree of correlation was found in Germany. Id.
123. See Black & Gilson, supra note 20, at 257
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C. The Role of Culture
The popular perception is that the United States is a country
of adventurous risk-takers. 124 Certainly, a society that produced
twenty-something Wunderkinds such as Bill Gates, Steve Jobs,
and Marc Andreessen cannot be said to frown upon risk-taking.
125
Entrepreneurial zeal alone, however, is insufficient to create
sustained innovation; it is the institutional structure and related
legal framework in the United States that has enabled
entrepreneurs to succeed. 2 6 Venture capital epitomizes the
synergistic combination of law, economics, and entrepreneuralism.
Netscape, the brainchild of venture capitalist Jim Clark and
programmer Marc Andreessen, provides a prime example of this
synergy.
127
Andreessen was an undergraduate at the University of
Illinois writing software code for $6.85 an hour for the university's
National Center for Supercomputing Applications when he came
up with an Internet browser program called Mosaic.
128
Andreessen put the browser on the Internet for anyone to
download for free. 129 The browser proved to be quite popular
and frequently downloaded, but Andreessen could not figure out
a way to make money from it.130 Enter Clark, a seasoned venture
capitalist who previously co-founded Silicon Graphics, Inc., a
successful Silicon Valley computer company.131 Clark became
aware of Andreessen's efforts through the Internet.132 In short
order, the two met and Clark decided to invest in Andreessen's
browser technology-a new company was born.133 Andreessen's
programming wizardry and Clark's business acumen combined to
124. Sibbitt, supra note 5, at 83.
125. Respectively the founders of Microsoft Corporation, Apple Computer, and
Netscape, who each started his company while still in his early twenties. Bill Gates' Web
Site-Biography, http://www.microsoft.com/billgates/bio.asp (Dec. 2000); Steve Jobs
Timeline, http://www.sfgate.com/net/projects/stevejobstimeline.html (last visited July 6,
2001); Wagner, supra note 1.
126. See supra Part ll.B.
127. See Wagner, supra note 1.
128. See id.
129. Id
130. See Tom Steinert-Threlkeld, Can You Work in Netscape Time?, FAST CO., Nov.
1995, at 86, available at http://www.fastcompany.com/online/Ol/netscape.html (last visited
Nov. 25, 2000).
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
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make Netscape one of the most successful Internet companies of
the 1990s.
134
As previously discussed, but for the unique U.S. venture
capital contracting model that enabled Clark and Andreessen to
quickly come to terms on the formation of the company; the
existence of the NASDAQ stock market that made it attractive for
Clark to invest in Netscape (because of the possibility of cashing
out via an IPO); 135 and the SEC's regulation of the NASDAQ that
gave investors the confidence to invest in Netscape, Andreessen's
innovative browser could have conceivably remained just that-a
single-purpose program to be downloaded for free from the
Internet. 136
Another, perhaps lesser-known fact demonstrates the U.S.
legal system at work in unexpected ways. Although Andreesen
wrote the Mosaic program, the program actually belonged to
Andreessen's employer, the University of Illinois, which
subsequently claimed rights to the name "Mosaic" and sued to
block Clark and Andreessen from naming their new company
"Mosaic Communications Corporation.' '137  Clark and
Andreessen had to rename their new company Netscape. 138 As
frustrating as the ensuing legal battle was for Andreessen, 139 it
provides a valuable lesson to all would-be entrepreneurs that the
U.S. legal system safeguards the interests of innovators of all
shapes and sizes.
Shareholders are also protected by the U.S. legal system.14 °
For example, an investor bilked by fraud or misrepresentation in
an IPO has a myriad of legal options available to him or her.
141
The investor can sue the company's management, its board of
directors, its accountants, its underwriters, and even its lawyers,
134. Id.
135. In fact, Clark subsequently used the money he made from the Netscape
investment to establish another company, Healtheon Corp. Larry Kanter, Jim Clark,
SALON.COM, at http://www.salon.com/people/bcI1999/11/24/clark/print.html (Nov. 24,
1999).
136. See Wagner, supra note 1.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Andreessen still harbors some resentment over the actions taken by his former
employer; he claims that the National Center for Supercomputing Applications was trying
to shut down his young company. Id
140. Cox ETAL, supra note 1, at 590.
141. See id. at 589.
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both individually and derivatively. 142  Should the shareholder
prevail in a court of law, the defendants can be held jointly and
severally liable for monetary damages. 143  Additionally, such an
investor does not lack access to legal representation, as there is
one lawyer for every 300 people in the United States.
144
Contingency fee arrangements also make legal representation
affordable to the average investor. 145 Legal recourse has served as
a check on corporate management's execution of its duties and
continues to bolster investor confidence. 46
III. THE GERMAN AND JAPANESE MODELS
By all accounts the venture capital industries in Germany and
Japan have not achieved anywhere near the exponential growth as
the venture capital industry in the United States. 147 In comparison
to the United States, the venture capital industries in Germany
and Japan are smaller both in terms of the relative number of
venture capital funds and in the actual dollar amount of
investment by the funds.148  There are approximately one-fifth
fewer venture capital firms in Japan than in the United States.
149
These firms also invest less capital on both cumulative and annual
bases. 150  For example, in 1993 alone, 637 U.S. venture capital
firms disbursed over $3 billion in funds, while 121 Japanese
venture capital firms disbursed $76 million. 151
This lack of an active venture capital market is also reflected
in the far smaller number of startup companies listed on the over-
142. Id. at 591. A shareholder derivative suit is maintained by the shareholder of a
company on behalf of, and for the benefit of the company and other shareholders. See
Sibbitt, supra note 5, at 91.
143. Cox ErAL, supra note 1, at 611,616.
144. Sibbitt, supra note 5, at 90.
145. See id.
146. Indeed, the proliferation of shareholder derivative suits has led some to argue that
the balance of legal protection is weighed too much in favor of the shareholder. See, e.g.,
Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 55 (1991).
147. See, e.g., Black & Gilson, supra note 20, at 251.
148. Milhaupt, supra note 16, at 875; see also Black & Gilson, supra note 20, at 251
(noting that the German venture capital industry is a fraction of the size of its U.S.
counterpart).
149. Sibbitt, supra note 5, at 62.
150. Id
151. Milhaupt, supra note 16, at 875.
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the-counter (OTC) stock market in Japan. 152 The dominant OTC
market in the United States (the NASDAQ) is nine times the size
of the Japanese equivalent. 153  In Germany, venture capital
investments accounted for 0.01% of German Gross Domestic
Product in 1994, only one-fifth of the U.S. level. 54
Scholars and legal commentators attribute this lack of
venture capital growth to the bank-centered corporate governance
system in both Japan and Germany, as compared to the U.S.
market-driven system. 155 Indeed, German and Japanese venture
capital development must be positioned in the context of the
bank-centered governance system in order to understand its lack
of vitality.
156
A. The Impact of Law on the Structure of Venture Capital Funds
in Germany and Japan
The German and Japanese venture capital markets are
strikingly different from that in the United States; their
characteristics "bear the strong influence of a bank-oriented
governance system."'157 Banks in Germany and Japan wield
enormous power over their respective country's economy by
virtue of controlling the largest corporations. 158  While such an
institutional structure has largely determined the development of
the financial markets in both countries, it is coextensive with the
role of law in terms of the impact on the venture capital industry.
As one commentator points out, "[t]he centrality of law and
regulations in restraining the generation and formation of venture
businesses" in both countries is unmistakable.
159
152. Sibbitt, supra note 5, at 62. OTC refers to the secondary stock market where
stocks of smaller companies are often traded, as compared to the primary stock market,
such as the Tokyo Stock Market in Japan or the New York Stock Exchange in the United
States, where stocks of more established companies are traded. Kate Kelly, E*Trade's
Switch to Big Board Leaves Nasdaq With Bad Taste, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2001, at C19.
153. Sibbitt, supra note 5, at 62.
154. Black & Gilson, supra note 20, at 266.
155. See, e.g., id at 883.
156. Milhaupt, supra note 16, at 869.
157. Id at 877.
158. See Roe, supra note 59, at 1937-39 (noting, for example, that the three largest
German banks together own over 32% of the stock of Siemens, and over 60% of Daimler-
Benz prior to its merger with Chrysler). Likewise in Japan, the five largest financial
institutions have historically owned over 21% of Toyota Motors, and almost 20% of
Matsushita. Id. at 1940.
159. Sibbitt, supra note 5, at 105.
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1. The Formation of a Venture Capital Fund
Lawspresent legal barriers to venture capital fund formation
in Japan.1 0 To begin, unlike venture capital funds organized as
limited partnerships in the United States, "[n]o available
organizational form in Japan offers venture capital providers both
flow-through tax treatment and limited liability."' 61 Though a
Japanese limited partnership entity (tokumei kumiai) technically
exists,162 tax regulations make it meaningless to venture capitalists
in practice. 163 The Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF) imposes a
withholding tax where there are ten or more limited partners,
which renders a limited partnership effectively off-limits to
venture capital funds, as such funds generally have large pools of
investors. 1 4
The most commonly used entity in Japan for institutional
investment in venture capital is the "partnership for investment
purposes [toshi jigyo kumiai]," which is a hybrid of the U.S.
general partnership and limited partnership. 165 Unlike the limited
partnership in the United States, this type of partnership offers
the benefit of no double taxation but lacks limited liability
protection to all its members. 166 Thus, unlike the United States,
the Japanese legal structure impedes the formation of venture
capital funds.
2. Sources of Funding
While in the United States investment in venture capital
funds comes from pension funds, insurance companies, and
individuals, in Japan it comes primarily from banks (24%) and
corporations (33%).167 The banks' contributions are made in the
form of loans, not equity.168 Japanese startups, therefore, must
use precious capital to repay the bank loans, instead of channeling
the money toward growing the business, thus increasing the risk of
160. See Milhaupt, supra note 16, at 888.
161. Id.
162. Hideki Kanda, Japan, in THE LEGAL BASIS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS 111 (Arthur R. Pinto & Gustavo Viscentini eds., 1998).
163. See Milhaupt, supra note 16, at 888.
164. Id.
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 877.
168. Id. at 882.
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business failure.169 Likewise in Germany, over 50% of the money
comes from banks, and slightly less than 10% comes from the
German government.
170
Additionally, investment by corporate pension funds, a staple
of U.S. venture capital, is completely absent in Japan and
Germany. 171 The Japanese MOF does not permit pension funds
to invest in venture capital funds. 172 "Restrictions on the use of
pension funds . . . clearly impede the funding of venture
businesses."' 173  Further, regulations permit Japanese pension
funds to remain unfunded, which render them incapable of
becoming a significant source of investment in venture capital
funds anyway.1 4 Similarly, in Germany, pension funds are not a
factor in the financial marketplace because German corporate
pension funds are also largely unfunded. 7 5
B. The Impact of German and Japanese Laws on the Operation
of a Venture Capital Fund
The reliance on bank loans and the lack of significant
independent sources of funding affect the o erations of venture
capital funds in both Germany and Japan. 17F In both countries,
seed and early stage venture financing is scarce because "the core
businesses of banks . . . do not involve high-risk equity
investments in start-up firms."'177 Instead, banks opt to provide
financing to later-stage expansion businesses that are close to
public offerings or being acquired. 78 Banks also favor traditional
low-tech industries such as retail and real estate while eschewing
new technology. 179 Though some venture capital firms have begun
to focus on high-tech and Internet investments, 180  these
investments tend to be small and scattered.' 8'
169. See id
170. Black & Gilson, supra note 20, at 251.
171. Id. at 269.
172. Milhaupt, supra note 16, at 877.
173. Sibbitt, supra note 5, at 105.
174. See supra Part II.B.2.
175. Black & Gilson, supra note 20, at 251.
176. Roe, supra note 59, at 1931 (noting that "[i]nstitutional ownership discourages
entrepreneurial leadership").
177. Milhaupt, supra note 16, at 881.
178. Black & Gilson, supra note 20, at 250.
179. Milhaupt, supra note 16, at 882; see also Sibbitt, supra note 5, at 62.
180. A notable example is Softbank, founded by Masayoshi Son, considered by many in
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Government regulations also discourage investment in
venture capital funds.182 For example, out of the desire to prevent
the reemergence of family-controlled conglomerates183 that
dominated the Japanese economy before World War II, the
Japanese Anti-Monopoly Law was enacted after the war,
prohibiting the formation of holding companies. 184  In order to
avoid being classified as a holding company, a venture fund must
limit stock ownership in its portfolio companies. 185  Such legal
restrictions are one reason venture capital firms in Japan have
taken significantly lower equity stakes in their portfolio companies
than their U.S. counterparts. 186 Until recently, venture capitalists
also could not play a direct role in the management of their
portfolio companies.
187
Additionally, stock options, so crucial to the growth of
startups in the United States because of the upside incentives they
provide to management and employees alike, have not been a
useful tool in Germany and Japan. 188  Existing Japanese law
makes "the issuance of stock options so cumbersome as to be
practically unworkable.' 189 Without stock options to compensate
for the risk managers take by joining a startup, it becomes difficult
to attract top talent.190  Similarly, in Germany there were
numerous legal restrictions on the issuance of stock options until
Japan to be an iconoclast for his daring entrepreneurialism, who, perhaps not
coincidentally, was educated at the University of California at Berkeley. See The
Internet's Finacier [sic], TIME DIGITAL 50, at
http:lwww.time.com/time/digital/digital50/21.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2001); see also
Robert A. Guth, The Rainmaker, Masayoshi Son's Role As Internet Kingpin In Japan Is
Shrinking, WALL. ST. I., Mar. 29, 2001, at Al.
181. See Lark Park, Venturing Around the World, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Nov. 20,
2000, at 142.
182. See Milhaupt, supra note 16, at 889.
183. These conglomerates, known as zaibatsu, engaged in monopolistic practices. Id.
184. Id
185. Id. at 890.
186. Sibbitt, supra note 5, at 93. Another reason is that because of the bank-centered
financial system, both Germany and Japan have historically favored debt financing over
equity. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and
Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United
States, 48 STAN. L. REv. 73, 85, 89 (1995). Japanese companies borrow $5.33 from banks
for every dollar they raise in the capital markets, German companies borrow $4.20, and
U.S. companies borrow only $0.85. See id.
187. Milhaupt, supra note 16, at 890.
188. Id
189. Id
190. See id. at 891-92.
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May 1, 1998, when the Stock Corporations Act was amended191
to allow employee and management stock options, but only with
shareholder approval.192
C. The Impact of Law at the Point of Exit
Exit from an investment in a portfolio company is crucial to
the success of venture capital. 193  The most frequently used
method of exit in the United States is the IPO.194 In both
Germany and Japan, such an exit is rarely available.
195
Government regulations have stifled growth of a public equity
market, which in turn has resulted in a lack of liquidity for venture
capitalists.
196
1. The Stock Markets Do Not Provide a Viable Means of Exit
"Japan's bank-centered system severely limits the potential
for an exit through an IPO.' 97 The government's strict listing
requirements involving profitability guidelines and minimum net
asset requirements have made the barrier of listing the stock on
the secondary market significantly high for Japanese startups, as
these companies are generally not yet profitable and usually
undercapitalized. 9 8  Even after a company meets the formal
listing standards, it still must pass the informal but more stringent
"practical listing standards" applied by the MOF.199  Not
surprisingly, it takes a Japanese startup twenty to twenty-nine
years to go from formation to IPO, 200 while the average time in
the United States is five to seven years. 201  Given the average
lifespan of a person, it is not difficult to imagine that waiting
191. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporate Governance: Pathways to Covergence? Two Steps
on the Road to Shareholder Capitalism in Germany, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 219, 236 (1999).
192. § 192(1)(3) Aktiengesetz (Stock Corporation Law).
193. Milhaupt, supra note 16, at 883; see discussion supra Part II.B.4.
194. See discussion supra Part H.B.4.
195. Milhaupt, supra note 16, at 883.
196. Id at 884.
197. Id. at 883.
198. Id. at 884. Contrast this with the United States, where the NASDAQ does not
impose profitability requirements for a company to be listed. Kelly, supra note 152, at
C19.
199. Milhaupt, supra note 16, at 884.
200. Sibbitt, supra note 5, at 62.
201. Id.
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almost thirty years to reap the benefits of one's investment hardly
provides an incentive to invest in a venture fund.
Incredible as it may seem, from 1992 to 1995, the MOF
administered a queue for IPOs, limiting them to five per week.2 °2
This quota system resulted in a backlog of over 120 companies
waiting for regulatory approval,20 3 and in part accounts for the
huge disparity between the average 637 listings per year on the
NASDAQ market and the forty-four listings per year on the
Japanese OTC market.
20 4
The German stock markets are notoriously illiuid; exits
through the stock market are largely unavailable. 2°5  IPOs
historically have been rare in Germany.20 6 For example, there
were only ten IPOs in all of 1994.207 Additionally, out of the
twelve IPOs in 1995, only one was on the German stock market;
the rest were on overseas markets. 20 8  Obviously, venture
capitalists do not perceive the German stock market as providing
a viable means of exit.20 9 Commentators, including the German
government, attribute this lack of breadth of the German stock
market to the bank-dominated financial system, which hinders the
development of a shareholder culture. 210 Given the dominance of
banks over corporate financing, there has been no urgent need to
develop other sources of funding, such as through the stock
market.
211
2. Inadequate Disclosure Laws and Lack of Enforcement
Undermine Investor Confidence
The most critical factor in the success of the U.S. stock
market is securities regulation and the principle of full
disclosure. 212  Inadequate disclosure requirements and
enforcement in Germany and Japan have led to investors' lack of
202. Id. at 67.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Black & Gilson, supra note 20, at 251.
206. See Gordon, supra note 191, at 220.
207. Id. at 220.
208. Black & Gilson, supra note 20, at 251.
209. See Gordon, supra note 191, at 220.
210. Id.
211. See id
212. Fox, supra note 113, at 113 n.1.
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confidence in the German and Japanese stock markets.213 "Japan
has a securities statute that closely parallels the Securities and
Exchange Act of the United States." 214  Enforcement of the
statute, however, is virtually nonexistent as regulators emphasize
"de facto screening" of issuers rather than full disclosure.
215
In the last four decades, the MOF engaged in virtually no
formal market monitoring or enforcement activity. 216  For
example, securities fraud and insider trading regulations, though
long in existence, have not been enforced. 217 An atmosphere of
distrust prevails as financial corruption scandals (involving those
at the highest levels of government) surfaced, to which regulators
turned a blind eye.
218
In Germany, disclosure rules of publicly traded companies
are not nearly as comprehensive as those in the United States.
219
For example, the scope of disclosure for issuance of stock options
is primarily at the discretion of management, 220 which means a
company can choose not to disclose material financial information
about itself. Germany also did not have any law banning insider
trading until 1994, when it was forced to respond to the European
Commission's infringement proceedings. 221 The Neuer Markt, the
German equivalent of the NASDAQ, resisted tightening
regulations until recently, when investors demanded changes
amidst allegations of trading irregularities, insolvency, and
unanticipated earnings announcements. 222  This lack of
transparency leaves investors in the dark about corporate
213. See, e.g., Lily H. Li, World Watch: Europe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2000, at A25
(reporting that a series of incidents on Germany's Neur Markt "rocked investor
confidence.").
214. Fox, supra note 113, at 113 n.1.
215. Id
216. Milbaupt, supra note 25, at 60.
217. Sibbbitt, supra note 5, at 89.
218. See, e.g., id. at 90 (describing the "Recruit" Scandal of 1989, where shares of
unlisted companies were sold to associates of then Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita,
Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa (who later became Prime Minister), and former Prime
Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone). Immediately after the companies went public, recipients of
these shares sold them for four times more than the original cost. Id.
219. Gordon, supra note 191, at 236.
220. Id.
221. See Ursula C. Pfeil, Comment, Finanzplatz Deutschland: Germany Enacts Insider
Trading Legislation, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 137, 137 (1996).
222. Li, supra note 213, at A25.
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governance 223 and has caused investors to place less value on
financial disclosures, even when such disclosures are made.
224
Ultimately, the result of the German and Japanese bank-
centered governance system is that the institutional structure and
legal framework needed to support venture capital investments
are either not available or underdeveloped in both countries.
225
Conversely, the laws that do exist in both countries operate to
hinder the development of venture capital funds.
D. The Role of Culture
Japan's cautious culture also handicaps the development of
an active venture capital market.226 Historically, Japanese society
has imposed and rewarded group conformity over
individualism.227 "A Confucian moral order mitigates self interest
and opportunism.' 228 Children learn from an early age to heed
the teachings exemplified by the Japanese proverb, "the nail that
sticks up gets hammered down" (deru kui ga uttareru).229 With
individual creativity and individualism thus stifled, entrepreneurial
spirit is hampered.23 ° One recent study found, not surprisingly,
that when Americans and Japanese were asked whether starting a
business was a respectful occupation, 91% of Americans said yes,
whereas a meager 8% of Japanese agreed.231
Because conformity is prized, iconoclastic behavior becomes
more costly, which renders individual risk-taking even more
difficult.232 Not surprisingly, a culture of risk-aversity pervades
Japanese society.233 This cultural trait, when translated to the
financial arena, means that Japanese investors prefer to play it
safe.234 Not only do they keep an "inordinately large" amount of
223. Gordon, supra note 191, at 236.
224. See Alford et al., supra note 122, at 204 (citing the results of a statistical study
showing that investors considered U.S. financial disclosures to be more relevant than those
required by German stock exchanges).
225. Milhaupt, supra note 16, at 869.
226. Id at 894.
227. See Sibbitt, supra note 5, at 70, 77, 81.
228. Milhaupt, supra note 25, at 6.
229. Sibbitt, supra note 5, at 81.
230. See id. at 77-78.
231. Evelyn Iritani, Japan Giving Its Start-Ups a U.S. Education, With Limited
Success, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 10, 2000, at Cl.
232. Sibbitt, supra note 5, at 82.
233. See id. at 84.
234. See id
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capital in safer investments such as bank deposits, but they also
invest less in stocks and bonds than the average American
235
Therefore, it is not a coincidence that even though Japanese
personal financial assets exceed $10 trillion, there are no angel
investors in Japan, 236 and virtually no seed stage venture capital
funding. 237 Also, venture capital funding tends to focus on mature
industries, which are less risky.
238
Additionally, while the United States has historically been
"anti-big" (big banks or big corporations), 239 "[a] populist, anti-
bank ethos is historically absent in Japan. ' ' 4 ° This is partly due to
the futility of such opinions because Japan did not become a
democracy until after World War 11.241 Likewise, in Germany,
though dominance by German banks in its economic landscape is
paramount, populist anti-bank sentiments have never been as
fervent as in the United States.242 "Germany has never known
anything like the fear and resentment that monopoly used to
arouse in the United States."243 Partly due to the existence of
codetermination, where employees have significant representation
as board members of the largest corporations, interest groups are
given a voice in corporate governance by law,244 thereby obviating
much of the populist angst.245 Without the need to rail against the
big and the mighty, would-be entrepreneurs in Germany and
Japan are deprived of the impetus to strike out and challenge the
establishment by pursuing alternative paths.
246
235. Id. at 84.
236. An angel investor is an individual who provides initial financing to a startup. See
Venture Capital Basics, supra note 19, at 5.
237. Milhaupt, supra note 16, at 877.
238. Id. at 894.
239. Some have commented that this anti-big posture has provided the genesis for
entrepreneurialism in the United States. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK
OWNERS: THE POLrICAL RooTs OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 258,279 (1994).
240. Roe, supra note 59, at 1976.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1969.
243. HENRY C. WALLICH, MAINSPRINGS OF THE GERMAN REVIVAL 136 (1955).
244. See Roe, supra note 59, at 1970. German law requires an equal number of
shareholder and worker representatives on a company's supervisory board. David Wessel,
U.S. v. Them, American Economy Offers a Model Others Both Envy and Fear, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 18, 2001, at Al.
245. See Roe, supra note 59, at 1970.
246. See ROE, supra note 239, at 279.
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The combination of social, economic, and cultural forces led
to deep-rooted bank dominance of venture capital investment
over individual investment in both Germany and Japan, and the
related legal framework contributes to the lackluster stock
markets.247 Because banks are not very effective in performing
the venture capital role,248 both countries have failed to develop a
strong venture capital industry as a result.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR A UNIQUE CHINESE MODEL
As discussed in Part II and Part III, in order to develop a
vibrant venture capital industry, certain parameters must be in
place: a market-centered corporate governance system, a highly
regulated securities market which aims to protect investors, and a
culture of risk taking-all backed by well-developed and
rigorously enforced laws. Measured against this backdrop, China
presently fails to meet almost all of the criteria.
A. The Present Institutional Structure in China
Since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949,
the Chinese economy has operated under a central planning
model borrowed from the Soviet Union.249 The twin pillars of the
Soviet socialist model were central planning and state
ownership. 250  Unlike the economies of the United States,
Germany, and Japan that function under the free market system,
control of the Chinese economy is solely vested in the hands of the
central government, which drafts five-year plans guiding China's
economic growth.25 ' Until recently, private ownership of
companies was outlawed in favor of exclusive state ownership.252
247. See Gordon, supra note 191, at 220.
248. Id. at 220-21.
249. See generally Lan Cao, The Cat That Catches Mice: China's Challenge to the
Dominant Privatization Model, 21 BROOK. J. INT'LL. 97, 108-09 (1995).
250. See Zongling Shen & Jianbo Lou, The Contemporary Socialist Market Economy
and the Law of the People's Republic of China, in FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE
GREATER CHINA AREA: MAINLAND CHINA, TArwAN AND HONG KONG SAR 5 (Joseph
L. Norton et al. eds., 2000).
251. See id. at 3-5.
252. The recent amendment to China's Constitution finally recognized private
ownership and elevated the status of private economy from "complement to the socialist
public economy " to "an important component of the socialist market economy."
Compare XANFA art. 11 (1993), translated in Lehman, Lee & Xu, Constitution of the
People's Republic of China-1993, http://www.chinalaw.cclib/general/01.htm (last visited
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Therefore, China does not have a market-centered corporate
governance system like the United States, and to the extent it has
a governance system at all, the role of the Chinese government is
somewhat analogous to that of the central banks in Germany and
Japan 253
By the end of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976),
with the opening of China to the West, the realization struck many
inside China that the rigid socialist economic model had only led
to the stagnation of the Chinese economy.254  In 1979, during a
tour of the southern province of Guangdong, Paramount Leader
Deng Xiaoping made the historic pronouncement that presaged
the waning of the socialist dogma and the dawning of a Western-
style, market-driven economy.255 Discussing the pros and cons of
a socialist versus a capitalist system, Deng famously said: "black
cat or white cat, it's a good cat if it catches mice." 256  Deng's
comments buoyed the spirits of the Chinese people (who began to
pursue dreams of wealth for the first time since 1949) and ushered
in an era of unprecedented economic growth in China.
257
B. Existing Barriers to Developing a Vibrant Venture Capital
Market in China
1. The Omnipotent Role of the Chinese Government
In spite of the flourishing of private enterprise in the last two
decades, the Chinese economy remains largely state-owned and
centralized. 258  The state sector still accounts for one-third of
industrial output, over one-half of total assets, and two-thirds of
Mar. 1, 2001), with XIANFA art. 11, (amended by art. 16 on Mar. 15, 1999), translated in
Constance A. Johnson, People's Republic of CHINA, in CHINA: CONSTTTONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 2 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., Supp. 1999).
253. See supra Part III.A. (discussing the role of German and Japanese banks in their
economies and venture capital markets).
254. See XIANFA art. 11 (amended Mar. 15, 1999).
255. See Cao, supra note 249, at 108 n.16.
256. Id
257. China's Gross Domestic Product grew an average of 9% annually from 1978 to
1994. See Robert A. Kapp (President, United States-China Business Council), Testimony
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in FED. NEws SERV., June 6, 1996,
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. China's economy is ranked by the International
Monetary Fund as the third largest in the world, behind the United States and Japan. Id.
258. See World Bank Report No. 16265-CHA, China's Management of Enterprise
Assets: The State as Shareholder, June 5, 1999, at 9 (on file with the Loyola of Los
Angeles International and Comparative Law Review).
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investment.259 The government controls every sector of the
economy, from banking to telecommunications, 2 60 from
agriculture to infrastructure construction. 261
Moreover, the government restricts the percentage of foreign
ownership in certain industrial sectors. 262 For example, foreign
investment in telecommunications projects are limited to less than
50%, and to 70% in medical facilities and retailing.263  These
seemingly arbitrary restrictions undoubtedly hamper the
development of a venture capital industry.264  By limiting the
shareholding of some of the most profitable areas of investment,
the government has created a less than favorable investment
climate for venture capitalists.
265
2. The State of Securities Regulation
The Chinese leadership's deep ambivalence over the
direction of the Chinese economy is most vividly illustrated by the
government's regulation of the Chinese securities industry.266 On
one hand, China clearly sees the benefits of attracting foreign
capital via a growing securities market.267 On the other hand, "the
mentality associated with traditional central planning persists, and
tight government control continues with a goal of striving to
maintain the dominance of state ownership." 268  Thus, the
resulting securities laws are a hodgepodge of Western free-market
tenets, mixed with principles of state control.269 Whether this
259. Id.
260. "The People's Bank of China is the central bank of the People's Republic of
China. The People's Bank of China shall, under the leadership of the State Council,
formulate and implement monetary policies and exercise supervision and control over the
banking industry." I.A. TOKLEY & TINA RAVN, BANKING LAW IN CHINA 55 (1997)
(citing Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China, art. 2
(1995)).
261. See Enter at Your Own Risk, supra note 10.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. Id
265. See id.
266. See Jay Zhe Zhang, Comment, Securities Markets and Securities Regulations in
China, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 557, 560 (1997).
267. See id. at 620.
268. Id.
269. See Xian Chu Zhang, The Old Problems, the New Law, and the Developing
Market-A Preliminary Examination of the First Securities Law of the People's Republic
of China, 333 INT'L LAW. 983, 988, 1013 (1999).
20011
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
framework is suitable to the development of a healthy venture
capital industry is dubious.
a. The Development of the Securities Market in China
In the last decade, China has developed an active securities
market, though China does not yet have its equivalent of a
NASDAQ market.270 Since the founding of the Shanghai Stock
Exchange in 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1991, the
Chinese securities industry as a whole has emerged as a fairly
large and integrated system in a short time. 271  Ironically, the
Chinese government provided the impetus for a securities market,
for "the fundamental function of the Chinese securities market
has been to serve the economic goal of the state by extricating the
government from continuing to subsidize the deeply troubled state
owned enterprises (SOEs) 2 7 2 As such, unlike the United States,
Germany, and Japan, where the sole purpose of securities markets
is to provide an efficient exchange mechanism for shareholders,
the development of securities regulation in China has evolved
around the protection of state interests rather than shareholder
interests .273
b. The Regulatory Framework
The Chinese government has tightly controlled the securities
market since its inception.274 Initially, the People's Bank of China
was designated by the central government as the securities market
authority.275  In 1993, the State Council Securities Regulatory
Commission (SCRC) was established, and replaced the People's
Bank of China as the regulatory authority.
276
On December 29, 1998, the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress adopted China's long-awaited formal
securities legislation, the Securities Law of the People's Republic
of China (Securities Law).277 The Securities Law, which became
270. See Zhang, supra note 266, at 563.
271. See id. at 559.
272. Zhang, supra note 269, at 985.
273. See id at 988 (commenting that the security markets in China have the "effect
and purposes.. . to preserve and enhance the socialist order").
274. Id. at 985.
275. Zhang, supra note 266, at 561.
276. Id. at 562.
277. See Zhang, supra note 269, at 983.
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effective on July 1, 1999, was in the drafting stage for six-and-a-
half years.278 Prior to its passage, China had no comprehensive
national securities law.279  Instead, the laws and regulations
governing issuance and trading of securities were found in two
separate pieces of legislation: the China Company Law (Company
Law) 280 and the Provisional Regulations on Stock Issuing and
Trading of 1993 (Provisional Regulations).281
i. The Company Law
The Company Law, promulgated by the Standing Committee
of the Eighth National People's Congress on December 29, 1993,
and effective on July 1, 1994, provides a general framework for the
establishment of shareholder-owned companies. 282  The
government's motive of protecting state interests is amply
demonstrated by the divided share trading structure. 283 Stocks in
a company may be offered in several share categories, each
representing a different form of shareholding. 284 In practice, four
share types are the most prevalent: A, B, H, and N.285 The A
shares are denominated in renminbi (RMB) 286 and subscribed to
by individual domestic investors. A shares trade on the domestic
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. 287  The A shares are
further divided into shares held by the state, such as an
administrative agency, state-owned firms, and individual
shareholders.288  Transfer of state shares are only allowed by
approval from the particular government entity involved.289 In
contrast, B shares are also traded on the two exchanges but are
278. Id.
279. See id.
280. Zhang, supra note 269, at 984-85.
281. The Securities Law codified the relevant provisions of Company Law and
Provisional Regulations. See id. at 985.
282. Zhang, supra note 266, at 560. The Company Law permits the establishment of
two types of companies: joint stock company and limited liability company. I.A. TOKLEY
& TINA RAVN, COMPANY AND SECURITIES LAW IN CHINA 5 (1998). This Comment
addresses the joint stock company only.
283. See Zhang, supra note 269, at 987.
284. Zhang, supra note 266, at 570.
285. Id at 571.
286. RMB is China's official currency, also known as yuan. TOKLEY & RAVN, supra
note 260, at 57.
287. See Zhang, supra note 266, at 571.
288. Id. at 570.
289. See id.
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reserved solely for foreign investors. 290 Additionally, B shares are
traded in U.S. dollars on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and in
Hong Kong dollars on the Shenzhen stock exchange.
29'
To attract foreign investment, the Chinese government
encourages state-owned Chinese companies to issue shares
directly on international markets.292  Consequently, H and N
shares were created, and are held only by foreign investors. 293 H
shares are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and N shares
are listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
294
Even though A and B shareholders ostensibly have the same
rights, the de facto inequity is obvious, given "the unequal access
to information, unequal liquidity, unequal prices, and unequal
formalities of transfer."295 In essence, the trading of domestic A
shares is limited to shares owned by private investors, which
represents only 20% of total common stock issued.296
Such a share trading structure has dire implications for a
venture capital industry. If a domestic venture capital fund invests
in a domestic Chinese startup, the fund's only avenue of exit
would be listing on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock
Exchange and issuing A shares.297 This option severely limits the
available market for the shares, and thus most likely will restrict
the stock's upside potential.
On the other hand, if a foreign venture capital fund invests in
a domestic startup, it is faced with a similar dilemma. Other than
going through the expensive and time consuming process of listing
on an overseas stock exchange such as the New York Stock
Exchange, with its attendant regulatory requirements, the only
viable option is to issue B shares on a domestic stock exchange.
This option automatically renders the stock off limits to all
Chinese citizens, not exactly the outcome any venture capitalist
would desire.
290. Id. at 571.
291. See id.
292. Id.
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. Zhang, supra note 269, at 987.
296. Id. at 989.
297. See id.
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ii. Provisional Regulations
In addition to the Company Law, the State Council also
promulgated Provisional Regulations in May 1993.298 These
regulations apply to "any issuance and trading of securities and
other related activities" within China (i.e., A shares).299 Among
the conditions that must be met for listing on the two exchanges,
the company must have paid-in registered capital of RMB ten
million,300 and after-issue capitalization of at least RMB fifty
million.301 In addition, the company must have been profitable for
at least three years.30 2  These requirements favor state owned
companies and eliminate all but the largest private enterprises
from having access to securities markets. 3° 3 "It is not surprising
that almost all the listed companies are transformed from
SOEs."
304
The clearest indication of a government that is struggling to
reconcile its socialist ideology with a stock market derived purely
from capitalism is the quota system that has existed since the
inception of the Chinese securities market.30 5  The central
government sets a fixed amount of stock to be issued during the
year and allocates the quota to provincial governments, which in
turn allocate the quota among companies under their control.30 6
Without a quota, a company cannot issue shares to the public.
30 7
This scheme is stunningly similar to that used by the MOF in
Japan, with the same detrimental results.30 8 Quotas are a major
barrier to companies entering the stock market.30 9  The quota
system essentially replaces the supply and demand mechanism of a
free market thus depriving the market of efficient allocation of
resources.316 From a venture capital perspective, the effects are
298. Zhang, supra note 266, at 569.
299. See id
300. ToKLEY & RAVN, supra note 282, at 147.
301. After-issue capitalization is the total value of issued stock. Zhang, supra note 266,
at 574.
302. Id. at 572.
303. See Zhang, supra note 269, at 987.
304. Id. at 986.
305. See Zhang, supra note 266, at 624.
306. Id. at 572.
307. Id. at 572-73.
308. See supra Part IH.C.1.
309. See Zhang, supra note 266, at 624.
310. Id. at 624-25.
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chilling because the quota system drastically impacts the liquidity
of the market by limiting the total stock offered at any given
time. 311 Instead of being able to go public according to its own
timetable and market conditions, a company would have to wait
for a quota allocation, thereby very possibly missing its window of
opportunity in the marketplace altogether.
iii. Securities Law
The recently enacted Securities Law makes explicit any listed
company's legal duty of continuous disclosure. 12  A listed
company is required to file an unaudited half-year report, and an
audited annual report with CSRC and the exchange. 313  In
addition, Article 62 requires a company to file and publish a
special report when any major event occurs that may have an
impact on the price of its stock but of which the public is not
aware.314 Moreover, Article 59 clearly states that a listed company
is responsible for the truthfulness, accuracy, and completeness of
its issuing and listing documents and shall ensure there is no false
record, misleading statement, or significant omission. 315
Because the hallmark of securities law is disclosure,316 these
disclosure requirements appear to be a step in the right direction
in protecting investors. Experiences in the last decade, however,
tell a far different story. To begin, proper disclosure is enabled by
accounting rules.317 For example, as discussed in Part II, in the
United States, publicly-traded companies must file quarterly (10-
0) and annual (10-K) reports with the SEC.318  These reports
must be prepared in accordance with GAAP, a formidable body
of accounting rules that form the foundation of financial statement
preparation by U.S. companies, 319 whether or not publicly-traded.
311. Id at 625.
312. Zhang, supra note 269, at 993; Securities Law art. 60 (1998), available at
http://www.chinaonline.com/refer/legal/Mmeyer-laws/pdflpdf-e/securitylaw-a4.pdf.
313. Securities Law art. 60; Zhang, supra note 269, at 994.
314. Securities Law art. 62; Zhang, supra note 269, at 994.
315. Securities Law art. 59; Zhang, supra note 269, at 994.
316. See supra Part H.B.4.
317. See Karmel, supra note 100, at 962. See generally Sherbet, supra note 116, at 894
(discussing the role of the U.S. accounting standards in U.S. securities regulation).
318. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
319. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. GAAP).
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In contrast, accounting regulations in China are in their
infancy.320  The General Accounting Law was adopted by the
National People's Congress in Janunary 1985, but was not widely
followed until amended in December 1993.321 The law is
applicable to government agencies, state-owned enterprises, and
institutions only.322  Laws regarding accounting for private
enterprises only became effective in July 1993, when the State
Council approved the Standards of Conduct of Enterprise
Accounting.323 The law provides that companies shalf adopt the
credit and debit (double entry) accounting method and maintain a
book of accounts. 324  The law also endorsed the principle of
income and expense matching, one of the fundamental concepts of
GAAP.325
Other than these rudimentary requirements, the accounting
laws provide little guidance in terms of the types of financial
statements to be prepared,326 the extent of disclosure, and the
timing of revenue and expense recognition. As a result, practices
differ widely from U.S. standards, 327 which significantly decreases
the reliance value of the financial statements.328  Furthermore,
inadequate financial statement disclosure leads to lack of
transparency, limits investor access to information, and affects the
quality of information available-all of which do not bolster a
venture capitalist's confidence in the stock market.329
320. See Martindale-Hubbell, People's Republic of China Law Digest: Accounting
(2000), LEXIS, Marhub Library, ASDIG File.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id
324. Id arts. 4, 16.
325. See id art. 17.
326. See supra Part II.B.3 (noting that in the United States, per FASB guidelines,
financial statements include, at a minimum, an income statement, a balance sheet, and a
statement of cash flows).
327. See Enter at Your Own Risk, supra note 10.
328. Even these rudimentary requirements are not always followed, leading many in
the investment community to question whether the numbers are really what they
represent. See Mark Magnier, China's Stock Market on Bumpy Road, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9,
2000, at C1.
329. Indeed, the investment environment is so fraught with peril, "marked by insider
trading, funny numbers, one-eyed regulators" that some have likened it to horse racing or
mah-jong. Id
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iv. Weak Regulatory Enforcement
No matter how complete rules and regulations governing the
stock markets are, they are rendered toothless without
enforcement. In this regard, the lack of regulatory enforcement
by the Chinese government echoes that of Germany and Japan
and is similarly detrimental to the growth of venture capital.33 °
Even though China has adopted securities regulations,
enforcement is ineffective. 331  Violations are prevalent as
regulators are stuck in a perpetual state of paralysis because of
bureaucratic infighting.332 For example, many listed companies
failed to submit financial reports to the China Securities
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the executive arm of the
SCRC,33 3 and no sanctions were levied by the CSRC.3 34 Just like
in Germany and Japan, where regulators have failed to enforce
the rules, this inadequate regulation of the securities market in
China has also led to loss of investor confidence and hinders
investment in the market.
335
c. Other Significant Barriers
Apart from the existence of administrative stock market
regulations that primarily function to serve the interests of the
government, a myriad of other laws also present obstacles to the
growth a healthy venture capital industry in China. To begin,
unlike the United States, China does not recognize a limited
partnership.336 A venture capital fund, organized as a partnership,
is subject to double taxation, 337 which provides a disincentive to
venture capital investors. Foreign investors are particularly
disadvantaged, as there is no assurance of the consistent
330. Compare supra Part II.B.4 (discussing SEC enforcement of securities regulations)
with supra Part III.C.2 (discussing German and Japanese regulators' lack of enforcement).
331. See Zhang, supra note 266, at 626, 627-28.
332. See id
333. See id. at 627-28 (explaining that even though the CRSC is the equivalent of the
U.S. SEC, its supervisory and regulatory powers are much more limited because securities
regulation is also controlled by various other governmental entities at both local and
national levels).
334. See, e.g., Sophie Roell, Survey-China 1996: The Watchdogs Bark, FIN. TIMES
(London), June 27, 1996, LEXIS, News Library, Fintme File.
335. See Zhang, supra note 266, at 629.
336. TOKLEY & RAVN, supra note 282, at 3.
337. See Enter at Your Own Risk, supra note 10; see also supra note 46 and
accompanying text (providing an explanation of double taxation).
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application of tax laws and adherence to international tax
treaties.338
Moreover, the availability of an exit, via an IPO, the pivotal
element of the success of the U.S. venture capital industry and the
stagnation of that in Germany and Japan, is largely nonexistent in
China because of the restrictive shareholding structure and quota
system. 339  As with Germany and Japan, the lack of liquidity
significantly limits the financial prospects of a portfolio
company. 340 Additionally, in certain cases an investor must obtain
approval from the government in order to dispose of his or her
interest in a company-a vivid example of the 3particular risks
associated with venture capital investing in China.
Finally, the role of the Chinese government in venture capital
development cannot be underestimated. The State Council
allocated over $800 million to set up venture capital funds in many
high-growth Chinese cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and
Shenzhen.342 The Chinese government as a significant venture
capital funding source is reminiscent of the role of the central
banks in Germany and Japan, 343 only the former wields even more
power.
To be sure, one can argue that without the Chinese
government, there would be no venture capital in China today.
But the government as investor has many drawbacks. Just as the
banks in Germany and Japan prefer to invest in lower risk late-
stage companies in traditional industries such as retail and real
estate,344 so does the Chinese government. In 1997 alone, more
than 50% of venture capital was invested in existing established
companies, while only 25% was invested in new companies.
345
Not surprisingly, "construction projects, consumer goods and
338. See Enter at Your Own Risk, supra note 10.
339. Compare discussion supra Part IV.B.2 (regarding China) with supra Part II
(regarding the United States) and supra Part III (regarding Germany and Japan).
340. Absent an IPO, the only other option available to U.S. investors is the sale of the
company to another entity-not a viable means of exit in China due to the operations of
the Company Law. See Zhang, suora note 266, at 568. An in-depth discussion of the
Company Law provisions governing the formation of a private enterprise in China is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
341. See Enter at Your Own Risk, supra note 10.
342. See id.
343. See supra Part 111.B.
344. See id
345. See Enter at Your Own Risk, supra note 10.
20011
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
industrial projects have long accounted for 50.4% of China's
venture capital, while high-tech industries such as computers,
electronics and biotechnology account for only 7.3%" as a direct
result of the Chinese government's focus on infrastructure
building in the last ten years.
346
This investment pattern seems to suggest that the focus on
venture capital can only be changed by a shift in the government's
economic growth agenda. At a minimum, the reliance on
government funding hinders the growth of private investment in
venture capital.347  China's government-driven system has led
some commentators to observe that "securities markets in China
do not remove enterprises from state control, or promote
capitalism in a Western sense. Their effect and purpose is to
preserve and enhance the socialist order.... .
348
C. The Role of Culture
Just as culture plays an important role in the success of the
U.S. venture capital industry and the lack thereof in Germany and
Japan,349 culture will inevitably be a major factor in the
development of the Chinese venture capital market. In this
regard, China shares similar traits with Japan, based on a common
Confucian social philosophy that encourages conformity,
obedience, and adherence to the status quo.350 Therefore, venture
capital growth in China will be similarly adversely impacted.
Given the risk involved in venture capital,351 those who are
willing to invest must be risk-takers, and those who are willing to
start a company from nothing must be innovative and resourceful.
346. Id.
347. See Roe, supra note 59, at 1955 (arguing that if U.S. banks had been allowed to
invest in securities markets, as is the case in Germany and Japan, it would have led to a
weak U.S. securities market).
348. Minkang Gu & Robert C. Art, Securitization of State Ownership: Chinese
Securities Law, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 115, 125 (1996).
349. Compare supra Part II.C (discussing the role of U.S. culture in developing venture
capital) with supra Part III.D (discussing the role of culture in Japanese and German
venture capital industries).
350. See MICHAEL HARRIS BOND, BEYOND THE CHINESE FACE: INSIGHTS FROM
PSYCHOLOGY 69-71 (1991).
351. See Venture Capital Basics, supra note 19, at 3 (citing research indicating that
historically 15% to 20% of portfolio companies fail).
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On both counts, China, like Japan, suffers from a culture that
discourages risk taking and entrepreneurialism.
352
Just as Japanese children are taught "deru kui ga uttaretu"
(the nail that sticks up gets hammered down),353 Chinese children
are familiar with the saying "shuda zhaofeng" (the bigger the tree,
the more likely to be blown by the wind).35  So from an early age,
"Chinese culture tends to suppress individual initiative and often
tames the spirit of the most resourceful and superior individuals,
rather than encouraging the sometimes erratic fire of
creativity." 355 Thus, there is no history and tradition of venture
capital in China, unlike the experience in the West.
356
Additionally, Chinese culture fosters a fundamental distrust
of outsiders with one's own money.357 This is manifested by the
prevalence of family-owned Chinese businesses, where direct
family members or those related by marriage hold key positions,
even though they may not be the most qualified people
available. 358 This inability to trust significantly affects the future
of venture capital in China, as the would-be Chinese provider of
capital to venture capital funds agonizes over the fate of his or her
money once invested in a venture capital fund in the hands of
"strangers," and the Chinese venture capitalist entertains similar
misgivings about whether a portfolio company's management can
be entrusted with the operations of the business.
359
Finally, the concept of "face" and the crucial role it plays in
Chinese society cannot be underestimated. 360  "Having 'face'
means you are viewed by your peers, superiors, and subordinates
as one in harmony with the prevailing disposition of society;
you've done nothing to violate conformity. "36 Failure brings
shame to oneself and one's family and causes the ultimate loss of
352. BOND, supra note 350, at 24.
353. Sibbitt, supra note 5, at 81.
354. Author's own translation.
355. CHIN-NING CHU, THE ASIAN MIND GAME: UNLOCKING THE HIDDEN AGENDA
OF THE ASIAN BUSINESS CULTURE-A WESTERNER'S SURVIVAL MANUAL 190 (1991).
356. For a brief history of venture capital in Europe, see Milhaupt, supra note 16, at
865.
357. See BOND, supra note 350, at 75.
358. Id. at 76.
359. Seeid at 75.
360. ARNE J. DE KEIJZER, CHINA: BUSINESS STRATEGIES FOR THE '90s 216 (1992).
361. Id
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face.362 From this perspective, the inherent riskiness of venture
capital is incompatible with the Chinese cultural mindset.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The lessons of venture capital development in the United
States, Germany, and Japan are clear: a market-oriented
corporate governance system is far more able to facilitate the
growth of venture capital than a bank-centered one. Further, a
country seeking to develop a robust venture capital market must
have laws in place to nurture a stock market and ensure a healthy
investment environment. China's centralized institutional
structure and government-dominated governance system suffer
from similar shortcomings as do Germany and Japan. Because the
Chinese government is not likely to give up control of the
economy altogether in favor of supply and demand created by a
free market, the present system is there to stay. Nevertheless,
within this framework, China can adopt laws to align itself more
with the successful U.S. venture capital model and less with
Germany and Japan.
First, in order to encourage formation of venture capital
funds, China should legally recognize limited partnerships and
develop laws that specify the rights and obligations of the general
partners and limited partners. It should also make changes in the
tax law to eliminate double taxation and promote investment in
limited partnerships. With such incentives, more investors may
become interested in venture capital funds, and the industry's
dependence on government funding would lessen.
Second, at the point of entry when the venture capital fund
makes the initial investment in a portfolio company, China should
draft venture capital contracting laws that govern the relationship
between venture capitalists and management of portfolio
companies. This would include comprehensive regulations
regarding board representation, employee compensation, stock
options, and restrictive covenants to protect the venture
capitalists.
Third, in order to create a means of exit for venture
capitalists, China should create a NASDAQ-type stock market
and draft securities regulations designed to provide full disclosure.
362. Seeid
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The newly-adopted Securities Law is a step in the right direction
but by no means sufficient.363 More complete accounting rules
aimed at migration to international accounting standards would
enormously facilitate disclosure of financial information. More
importantly, China should abolish the tiered shareholding
structure of A, B, H, and N shares, along with the much-maligned
quota system for IPOs.
Finally, enforcement of securities laws must be addressed at
the highest level of the Chinese government.364 China as a culture
has not always enjoyed a tradition of adhering to the rule of law as
have the United States, Germany, and Japan.365 As the Chinese
proverb goes: "[t]he mountain is high; the Emperor is far
away."366 This saying implies that no matter what the rules are,
the Chinese are inclined to do as they please "within their own
sphere."367 Given this cultural mindset, it is imperative that the
Chinese government use the full power of its authority to enforce
regulations and punish wrongdoers in order to show the public its
commitment to the rule of law in the marketplace.
Fundamentally, the growth of a successful venture capital
industry in China is possible only if the Chinese government is
willing to develop and enforce a set of laws not only uniquely
suited to the Chinese society, but also capable of moving the
Chinese economy toward integration into the global marketplace.
Moreover, as amply demonstrated by the experiences of the
United States, Germany, and Japan, venture capital laws do not
operate in a vacuum; the success of a venture capital industry
depends on a country's institutional framework.368 China must
concurrently develop its financial markets, accounting system, and
regulatory scheme, along with the promulgation of venture capital
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law. As China prepares to join the World Trade Organization, 369
these objectives take on new dimensions, with even deeper
resonance, because their successful implementation will largely
determine whether China is ultimately ready to become an
indispensable player in the global economic community.
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